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The Importance of “The Law of Conservation
of Securities”: A Reply to John P. Anderson’s
“What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed
Insider Trading?”
WILLIAM K.S. WANG*
Professor John P. Anderson’s article, What’s the Harm in Issuer-
Licensed Insider Trading?, argues that my “Law of Conservation of
Securities” has no moral relevance to the question whether to allow
such trading.
The Law of Conservation of Securities demonstrates that each stock
market insider trade has specific victims and is “advantage-taking.”
Some “advantage-taking” stock transactions are moral; others are
not. To determine whether stock market insider trading is immoral,
applying a principle such as utilitarianism or Professor Anthony
Kronman’s “paretianism” requires consideration of the harm stem-
ming from the conduct. The Law of Conservation of Securities identi-
fies the victims of each insider trade and enables analysis of the
indirect consequences of that injury, such as wider bid-ask spreads
by market makers and impaired investor confidence—both of which,
in turn, increase firms’ cost of equity capital.
Specifying the actual victims also helps to determine whether the
market would know how much to adjust share prices for the possibil-
ity of insider trading and whether such adjustments (even if accurate)
would compensate all investors for the risk of injury. With corpora-
tion-approved insider trading, the issue also arises whether the deci-
sionmakers adequately consider the interests of non-shareholder
victims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor John P. Anderson’s article, What’s the Harm in Issuer-
Licensed Insider Trading?,1 argues that my “Law of Conservation of
Securities” has no moral relevance to the question whether to allow such
trading.
Although the Law of Conservation of Securities does not resolve
the issue, the “law” does identify the victim(s) harmed by each stock
market insider trade and aids in ascertaining the indirect effects of such
harm, such as wider bid-ask spreads by market makers and impaired
investor confidence—both of which, in turn, increase firms’ cost of
equity capital. Specifying the actual victims of insider trades also helps
to determine whether the market would know how much to adjust share
prices for the possibility of insider trading and whether such adjustments
(even if accurate) would compensate all investors for the risk of injury
from an insider trade. With company-approved insider trading, the ques-
tion also arises whether the decisionmakers adequately consider the
interests of non-shareholder victims.
Some argue generally against the regulation of victimless crimes,
but my Law of Conservation of Securities demonstrates that each stock
market insider trade actually injures specific individuals. Whether to
permit an insider trader to “take advantage” of these individuals is a
separate question whose answer likely depends in part on the direct and
indirect consequences of the Law of Conservation of Securities.
II. “NON-DISCLOSURE VICTIMS” VERSUS “TRADE VICTIMS” OF A
STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADE
A stock market insider trade has two different classes of victims:
(1) Those both harmed by the accompanying non-disclosure2 and
owed a duty to disclose by the insider trader (possible victims include
the party on the other side of the trade, “contemporaneous” opposite-
type traders, or all opposite-type traders between the time of the insider
1. John P. Anderson, What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 795 (2015) [hereinafter Anderson, What’s the Harm?].
2. For a discussion of the harm from the non-disclosure aspect of a stock market insider
trade, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 3.4 (3d ed. 2010).
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trade and public dissemination of the non-disclosed information).3
(2) Those harmed by the insider trade itself (i.e., those who have
suffered but-for injury from the insider transaction).4 The Law of Con-
servation of Securities identifies these victims: those whose trades were
preempted and/or induced by the insider transaction.5 The Law of Con-
servation of Securities does not deal with the non-disclosure victims.
To illustrate, suppose I sell one share based on material, nonpublic,
adverse information. If I had a pre-existing duty (or my sale triggered a
retroactive duty) to disclose the bad news to my buyer (or to a larger
class of purchasers), my non-disclosure harmed the buyer(s). Had I dis-
closed, she/they would not have purchased.6
Apart from the injury caused by my non-disclosure, who is harmed
by the transaction itself? Had I not sold my stock, the person on the
other side might have bought from someone else who was attempting to
sell.
Nevertheless, even if my trade did not injure the party on the other
side, my transaction must have a victim. Assume that the number of
shares is constant.7 At the time of dissemination of the material adverse
information, I have one less share. Someone else must have one more
3. For a discussion of those to whom a stock market insider trader might owe a duty to
disclose, see id. § 3.4.3. For a discussion of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 insider trading classical relationship triangle (issuer, insider, and party on the
other side of the insider trade), see id. § 5.2.1. For a discussion of a private cause of action against
a stock market insider trader by “contemporaneous” opposite-type traders, see id. §§ 6.2–6.4,
6.5.3–6.5.7, 6.10.1. “Opposite-type trades” are those opposite in type from the insider transaction.
If the insider trade is a purchase, “opposite-type” transactions are sales. If the insider trade is a
sale, “opposite-type” transactions are purchases.
4. For a discussion of the harm from the trade aspect of a stock market insider transaction,
see id. § 3.3.
5. See id. §§ 3.3.5–3.3.7; William K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims,
Violators and Remedies—Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic
Defect, 45 VILL. L. REV. 27, 29–30 (2000) [hereinafter Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies].
See also Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading Via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 806 (2014)
[hereinafter Fried, Insider Trading] (“When insiders use private information to time their personal
trades, they directly reduce shareholders’ returns. Each dollar reaped by insiders comes at public
investors’ expense.”); id. at 806–07 (explaining the diversion of value from public investors that is
created by insider trading). Cf. id. at 827–28 (estimating that value diversion by insiders from
indirect trading through company transactions amounts to several billion dollars a year). In an
earlier article, Professor Fried estimated that through direct insider trading transactions, corporate
insiders diverted almost $5 billion a year from the public. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the
Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
303, 323 (1998).
6. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. For a related discussion, see infra notes R
63–65 and accompanying text. R
7. Even if the number of shares is not fixed, the insider trade still harms preempted and
induced traders. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.8. Nevertheless, assuming a R
constant number of shares simplifies the analysis. See id.; Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra
note 1, at 802 n.43.
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share. That someone is either an induced buyer or a preempted seller.
Directly or indirectly, my sale either induced someone to purchase one
share or preempted someone from selling one share.8
III. THE ROLE OF THE “LAW OF CONSERVATION OF SECURITIES” IN
THE DEBATE ABOUT INSIDER TRADING AND ABOUT WHETHER ISSUERS
MAY PERMIT INSIDER TRADING BY EMPLOYEES
Many opponents of the regulation of stock market insider trading
seem to assume that it has no victims,9 and this assumption supports the
argument against regulation.
One analogy is to the controversy over regulating pornography.
Some contend that pornography is a victimless crime, while others argue
that pornography increases sex crimes and/or undermines respect for
women.10 “Whether pornography has victims does not resolve the ques-
tion of how to regulate it. Nevertheless, society is more likely to regulate
pornography strictly if it has victims. Similarly, whether insider trading
is a victimless crime does not resolve the question of how to regulate it.
Nevertheless, society is more likely to regulate insider trading strictly if
it has victims.”11
One source of confusion about insider trading’s harm is that even
without the insider trade, the party on the other side of the trade might
have traded anyway.12 The Law of Conservation of Securities explains
that even if a stock market insider trade does not injure the party on the
other side, the insider trade still harms particular individuals—i.e., the
preempted traders (who would have transacted but for the insider trade)
and/or the induced traders (who would not have transacted but for the
insider trade).13
Professor Anderson’s article discusses the debate whether to regu-
late insider trading14 and notes that those who argue that the practice
yields a net harm to society “typically claim that [insider trading]
increases the bid-ask spread set by market makers and . . . undermines
investor confidence in the markets (both of which in turn increase the
8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
9. For a discussion of the position that stock market insider trading is a “victimless crime,”
see John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 7–10 (2014) [hereinafter Anderson, Greed, Envy]. For a discussion of commentary
opposing regulation of stock market insider trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2. R
10. See Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 28 n.12. R
11. Id. at 28–29.
12. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, §§ 3.3.2–3.3.3. R
13. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, R
§§ 3.3.5–3.3.7; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 28–40. R
14. See Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra note 1, at 798–99 & nn.18–25. R
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cost of capital to firms).”15
Market makers trade frequently and thus will often be either the
preempted or induced trader-victims of insider trading.16 Consequently,
market makers are likely to respond by widening their bid-ask spreads.17
In short, the Law of Conservation of Securities explains why stock mar-
ket insider trading increases bid-ask spreads.
The Law of Conservation of Securities also explains why ordinary
investors are rational when insider trading undermines their confidence
in stock market investing despite the possible lack of harm to the other
side of the insider trade.18 Investors do not know whether they will be
injured (or generally even when they are injured).19 The fear of becom-
ing a victim of stock market insider trading may make risk-averse indi-
viduals especially reluctant to participate in the market.20
Because the risk is associated with the act of trading (or nearly
trading),21 “an investor cannot diversify away the risk by holding a . . .
portfolio of [diverse] stocks.”22 Many small transactions, as opposed to a
single large one, would decrease the extent of any harm but increase the
risk of injury. The risk of harm varies with the frequency of one’s trades
or near-trades.23
With a utilitarian approach, Professor Anderson would allow each
company to weigh the benefits and detriments of permitting employees
to trade on material nonpublic information. The costs include larger bid-
15. Id. at 205. Stock market insider trading increases the cost of equity capital of public
corporations generally and particularly for firms whose employees have a reputation for insider
trading. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.3.2, at 30 & nn.89–94; Wang, Victims,
Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 37 & nn.31–33.  For a discussion of commentary
supporting regulation of stock market insider trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2,
§ 2.3.
16. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, §§ 2.3.4, 3.3.6, at 67 & n.84, § 3.3.7, at 74 n.106; R
Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 38–40. For a related discussion, see infra R
text accompanying notes 21–23, 27–29. R
17. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.3.4; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, R
supra note 5, at 38–40 (“The presence of insider trading may cause specialists and market makers R
to widen their spreads to compensate for the risk of becoming a victim.”).
18. In an earlier article, Professor Anderson stated: “[T]here is no measurable risk of direct
harm to counterparties from insider trading, so that is not a concern that should discourage
investors from market participation.” Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 9, at 10. See id. at 52–53 R
(suggesting envy as one possible reason for the public antipathy toward stock market insider
trading). For a general discussion of the possible harm to investor confidence from stock market
insider trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.3.1. R
19. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.7; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, R
supra note 5, at 34 & n.25 (describing the task of identifying a preempted seller or induced buyer R
as “impossible”).
20. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 14 & nn.23–25. R
21. See id. § 3.3.6; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 31–35. R
22. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 14. R
23. See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. R
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ask spreads, less investor confidence, and higher cost of equity capital.24
Contrary to Professor Anderson’s conclusion, the Law of Conservation
of Securities has moral relevance because it underlies the costs that he
says issuers should consider.
IV. THE HARM OF INSIDER TRADING TO INDUCED OR PREEMPTED
TRADERS, EVEN WITH A LOWER MARKET PRICE RESULTING FROM
ISSUER APPROVAL OF INSIDER TRADING
Suppose a firm adopts and publicizes a policy that permits insider
trading by some or all of its employees. How does an investor determine
the discount in stock price that appropriately reflects the unknown risk
of becoming a victim of such trading and the uncertain liquidity cost of
larger bid-ask spreads? Determining the appropriate price adjustment is
extremely difficult,25 especially if the insider trading by each employee
is surreptitious.26
Even if, ex ante, the share price somehow accurately discounts the
risk of being a victim of insider trading (and the liquidity cost of
increased bid-ask spreads), this price decline would not adequately com-
pensate all investors for the risk of being a victim of a stock market
insider trade. As discussed above, “[t]his risk of harm is associated with
the act of trading (or of almost trading, in the case of a preempted
trader). Consequently, the risk varies with the frequency of one’s trades
(or ‘near trades’).”27 Therefore,
[E]ven if the return on [one or] all publicly traded stocks were
slightly higher because of the risk of harm from insider trading, the
higher return would not adequately compensate frequent traders for
incurring that risk. These victims of . . . [insider trading] are injured
even if they originally purchased their stock at a price that reflected
the average possibility of insider trading.28
24. For a discussion of those possible costs, see Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra note 1,
at 799. For a related discussion, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6, at 64 & nn.71–73 (explaining that the R
discount in stock prices necessary to reflect the risk of becoming a victim of insider trading
depends on both “the future frequency of the investor’s own trades and the future amount of
insider trading,” neither of which is easy to predict accurately); Wang, Victims, Violators and
Remedies, supra note 5, at 37. R
26. For a discussion of whether the issuer-approved insider trading by each employee would
be secret, see infra note 33 and accompanying text. Were the issuer to allow tipping, another R
question is whether direct and remote tippees would disclose their profits after the fact. See infra
note 33 and accompanying text. R
27. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6, at 66; Wang, Victims, Violators and
Remedies, supra note 5, at 37.
28. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6, at 67. See id. § 3.3.6, at 64–67; Wang, R
Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 37–38. More frequent trading does not increase R
the benefit from any discount in share prices (resulting from the risk of harm from insider trading).
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(Examples of such frequent traders include market makers, day traders,
and many hedge funds.)
To analogize, suppose apartment rents in one neighborhood are
slightly lower because a small percentage of arbitrarily chosen
residents will be mugged . . . or assaulted. Ex post, the unfortunate
victims suffer disproportionately and are only minimally compen-
sated by the lower rents. Ex ante, residents who take walks often are
not adequately compensated because they assume more risk than
others.29
Similarly, investors who often transact suffer disproportionately from
the wider bid-ask spreads resulting from insider trading.30
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, AND
GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM
The size of public firm executive compensation is controversial.31
Were a company to permit some or all of its employees to trade on
material nonpublic information, the corporation would, in effect, be
increasing compensation at the cost of induced or preempted traders.32
Unless each employee were required to disclose the insider trading profit
after the fact, the compensation would be secret.33
With each purchase, a frequent trader would buy at a discount. Nevertheless, with each sale, the
frequent trader would sell at a discount. Over time, the frequent trader would earn the same return
as the infrequent trader through dividends (ignoring transaction costs).
To illustrate, suppose closed-end fund shares sell at a constant percentage discount from net
asset value per share. Suppose an investor often switches from one closed-end fund to another,
buying and selling at the same discount. Assume that, without the discount, she would earn a six
percent rate of return. With the discount, she receives a seven percent return. The infrequent trader
who buys at a discount and holds long term gets the same seven percent return. For a discussion of
discounts on closed-end fund shares, see William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock
Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 387–94 & nn.147–54 (1986) [hereinafter
Wang, Stock Market].
29. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6, at 67; Wang, Victims, Violators and R
Remedies, supra note 5, at 38. For a somewhat similar analogy, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra R
note 2, § 3.5.2, at 94 & n.166. R
30. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6, at 68; Wang, Victims, Violators and R
Remedies, supra note 5, at 40. R
31. See Robert E. Wagner, Mission Impossible: A Legislative Solution for Excessive
Executive Compensation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 549, 551–68 (2012); Mark J. Loewenstein, The
Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000). For symposiums on
executive compensation, see Symposium on Executive Compensation, 64 VAND. L. REV. 349
(2011); Symposium, Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000).
32. But cf. M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 506
(2011) (presenting evidence that company boards of directors “bargain” with executives about the
profits they expect to make from transactions in firm stock and that executives whose trading
freedom increased through Rule 10b5-1 plans experienced reductions in other forms of
compensation to offset the potential profits from trading).
33. In an earlier article, Professor Anderson said that any objection to secrecy “can be
overcome by requiring that corporations announce publicly any policies permitting insider
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If a firm were to permit some or all of its employees to tip, the
(possibly secret) compensation would be even larger. For gigantic
amounts, employees could sell material nonpublic information to hedge
funds and other institutional investors, also at the expense of induced or
preempted traders. Another issue is whether direct and remote tippees
would publicly disclose their profits after the fact.
In addition to the problems posed by its possible secrecy, employee
insider trading or tipping is inefficient compensation. Because of its
uncertainty, it is likely less valuable than regular compensation to risk-
averse employees.34 Were an insider allowed to tip, the profits of imme-
diate and remote tippees would be even less valuable to the insider/tip-
per because the benefit might be solely vicarious or the tippee might
share only a part of the profit with the insider.35
Moreover, insider trading or tipping would be especially costly to
risk-averse public investors who do not know whether they will be
victims.36
The amount of trading profit is also not directly linked to the con-
tribution of the employee.37 In addition, employee insider trading may
decrease the alignment between shareholders and managers and enable
the latter to profit by short-selling stock after business decisions turn out
poorly.38 Insider trading may also distort incentives by inducing execu-
trading.” Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 9, at 17. Announcement of the policy would not R
disclose the amount of profit gained by each employee. In a later article, however, Professor
Anderson said that, were companies to permit insider trading, they “should . . . disclose their
insiders’ . . . profits in some summary form.” John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for
Insider Trading Law: From Trading Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 381
(2015) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change].
34. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 12 & n.13 (“[I]nsider trading may be R
inferior to other forms of executive remuneration because of insider trading’s nature as a form of
special ‘in kind’ compensation. . . . [T]he manager is uncertain exactly what amount of profit he
will receive. Insider trading as a fringe benefit is like a lottery ticket, which risk-averse managers
will value at less than the payoff.”).
35. See id. § 2.2.1, at 13 & nn.15–16.
36. See id. § 2.2.1, at 14 & nn.23–25 (“Any benefit to the firm is subsidized not by all the
shareholders, but by arbitrarily determined individuals who bear a disproportionate burden. . . .
[T]o the extent that investors are risk averse, the fear of becoming a random victim of an insider
trade may be a great cost.”). For a related discussion, see supra notes 19–23 and accompanying
text.
37. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 13 & n.14 (“many firm employees may R
obtain inside information and trade on it without having any role in the production of the
information”); id. § 2.2.1, at 13 & n.18 (listing several reasons why insider trading is an inferior
method of executive compensation, including the fact that “profits from insider trading depend not
on the value of the insider’s contribution to the company but on the number of shares her wealth
allows her to purchase”); Fried, Insider Trading, supra note 5, at 807 (“[I]insider-trading profits R
are a peculiar type of pay. They are tied to insiders’ informational advantage and their ability to
control the flow of information to the market, not to their contribution to economic-value creation
by the firm.”). But see Henderson, supra note 32. R
38. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 13 & n.21 (allowing insider trading as a R
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tives to embark on (1) overly risky projects, (2) those difficult to assess
by outsiders, and/or (3) deliberately disastrous projects, which would
allow executives to profit by short selling.39
Another question is why the issuer does not publicly announce that
it will itself trade or tip based on material nonpublic information, rather
than allowing some or all of its employees to do so.40
Were a company board to approve insider trading or tipping by
some or all of its employees, one might question whether the board
really has the interests of the shareholders at heart. What if the original
founder of a public company still controls the board and holds a control-
ling block of shares?41 Were even independent shareholders to approve
form of manager compensation could potentially mean rewarding managers for failure or
otherwise enabling a manager to benefit from adverse developments); Fried, Insider Trading,
supra note 5, at 807 (“permitting insiders to sell before their firm discloses bad news reduces the R
financial payoff differential between good and poor performance, thereby undermining insiders’
incentive to increase value”).
39. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 2.2.1, at 12 & nn.11–12 & 20 (discussing (1) the R
incentive to engage in overly risky projects and those that are difficult for outsiders to assess (to
increase information asymmetry), and (2) the relative ineffectiveness of insider trading in aligning
interests of executives with those of shareholders); Fried, Insider Trading, supra note 5, at 807, R
826, 830–31 (weakening and distortion of incentives). But see Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note
9, at 10–11 (questioning whether executives would delay the release of material information in R
order to trade); id. at 13–14 (questioning whether insiders would intentionally create bad news to
profit from it); id. at 16–17 (arguing that insider trading can be efficient compensation). For a
discussion of arguments for and against insider trading as compensation, see WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 2, § 2.2.1. R
40. Of course, corporate insider trading or tipping raises its own problems, including the
following: (1) Would a firm in financial distress be tempted to raise funds by insider trading? (2)
How would investors react to a company that stated it would engage in insider trading or tipping?
For criticism of corporate insider trading, see Fried, Insider Trading, supra note 5, at 803–08, R
826–33, 839. For criticism of corporate tipping, see William K.S. Wang, Selective Disclosure by
Issuers, Its Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some Observations in Response to Professor Fox, 42 VA.
J. INT’L L. 869, 876–87 (2002) [hereinafter Wang, Selective Disclosure]. For a discussion of
policy arguments both for and against allowing corporate insider trading, see Mark J. Loewenstein
& William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 72–77 (2005),
reprinted in 35 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 425 (2005) [hereinafter Loewenstein &
Wang, Corporation]. For a discussion of the legal regulation of company insider trading (or
tipping) in its own shares, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 5.2.3[C], at 310; Fried, Insider R
Trading, supra note 5, at 812–15, 820–24; Loewenstein & Wang, Corporation, supra, at 47–72 R
(discussing both state and federal law); Wang, Selective Disclosure, supra, at 871–76.
41. A recent Wall Street Journal article said:
Meet the renegades of executive pay: two dozen companies, including Oracle
Corp., RadioShack Corp., and Nabors Industries Ltd., that keep giving top officers
sky high pay packages and luxury perks despite shareholder ire.
Investors have repeatedly voted against the salary and bonuses of these
companies at annual meetings. Yet the companies appear to have dug in their
heels—often because they have founders who still run the business.
Emily Chasan, Companies Say ‘No Way’ to ‘Say on Pay,’ WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2014, 1:36 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/08/26/companies-say-no-way-to-say-on-pa.
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such a policy, one might question whether they understood the conse-
quences of the policy.
Suppose the independent directors and the independent sharehold-
ers adopt a fully disclosed corporate by-law that allows certain employ-
ees to embezzle from the corporation. Paternalistically, the government
might simply nullify the by-law. Similarly, the government might nullify
a by-law permitting insider trading or tipping because of a paternalistic
conclusion that the decisionmakers must have made a mistake. A full
discussion of the complex issue of corporate governance is beyond the
scope of this article.
VI. EXTERNALITIES RESULTING FROM ISSUER-APPROVED INSIDER
TRADING OR TIPPING
Under the Law of Conservation of Securities, a stock market
insider trade harms induced and/or preempted traders.42 With an insider
sale, the victim is a preempted seller and/or induced buyer. With an
insider purchase, the victim is a preempted buyer and/or induced
seller.43
Suppose the victim is either an induced purchaser or a preempted
buyer who has not previously held shares in the company. Even if the
corporate decisionmakers are independent and sophisticated when decid-
ing to allow insider trading, they may not adequately consider the inter-
ests of individuals who do not presently hold shares.44 Although insider
trading may raise the firm’s cost of equity capital,45 the company may be
relying on other sources of financing.46
42. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6; R
Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 28–40. R
43. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, R
supra note 5, at 28–35. R
44. But see Henderson, supra note 32, at 543–44 (“Diversified shareholders are as likely to be R
current shareholders of a firm as they are future shareholders of the firm . . . .”). Many U.S.
shareholders, however, are not diversified. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6, at 66 & R
n.80; Wang, Selective Disclosure, supra note 40, at 879 & n.65. R
45. See supra note 15. R
46. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 646 (1988) (“In fact, firms
largely appear to avoid the stock market as a source of funding.”). See also Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Limits of the Public Stock Market: Theories, Empirics, and Regulatory Implications
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2569171 (stating
that United States public stock market does not provide meaningful financing for industrial
production); id. (manuscript at 44) (“It appears to be the case that American industrial
corporations, both historically and in more recent times, have demonstrated little need for public
equity financing, at least as a matter of normal development and growth.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635, 1646–66 (2009);
id. at 1665 (“The data are clear. Creditors own American business. Public shareholders have made
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VII. PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE “ADVANTAGE-TAKING”
I know little about moral philosophy and shall leave the debate on
that topic to Professors Anderson and Katz. Nevertheless, I shall make a
few comments.
The Law of Conservation of Securities shows that stock market
insider traders benefit by “taking advantage” of others—namely pre-
empted and induced traders.47 Professor Anderson responds by claiming
that every stock market trader intends to inflict harm by profiting at the
expense of others.48 This is an overstatement. Some sellers may solely
want to raise cash;49 others (e.g., purchasers of index funds) may want to
invest long-term without attempting to “time” the market or select
undervalued securities. Many others—such as dollar-cost averagers
(those buying a fixed dollar amount at periodic intervals)50 or SEC Rule
10b5-1 plan participants (corporate insiders using a SEC “safe harbor”
against insider trading liability)51—may want automatically to purchase
or sell a set amount at specific time intervals.
Nevertheless, many stock market traders do attempt to purchase
undervalued shares or sell overvalued ones. If these traders are success-
ful, does the Law of Conservation of Securities show that they gain at
the cost of induced and/or preempted traders?
For the following reason, the answer is yes. The Law of Conserva-
tion of Securities focuses on the pool of outstanding shares at the time of
dissemination of the material nonpublic information. At that time, the
insider trader holds either more or less stock at the expense of the pre-
empted and/or induced traders.52
Suppose a mispricing-seeking ordinary investor actually succeeds
in purchasing an undervalued stock or selling an overvalued one. Further
assume that, at some future date, the mispricing disappears. At that time,
little contribution to the core functions of American industrial corporations, the financing of
productive activity.”).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6; R
Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 28–40. R
48. See Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra note 1, at 803–04.
49. In an earlier article, Professor Anderson acknowledges “the case of a seller who is trading
solely to liquidate to cash . . . .” Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 9, at 36. R
50. For a discussion of dollar-cost averaging, see Mitat Lika, How to Keep Up with the Big
Guys, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at S45.
51. But see Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 33, at 357, 362–66 (insiders R
may be using unintended loopholes in Rule 10b5-1 plans to trade strategically and beat the
market). For a general discussion of SEC Rule 10b5-1 plans, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note
2, § 4.5.3; Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change, supra note 33, at 345–54. R
52. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6; R
Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 28–40. R
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under the Law of Conservation of Securities, the successful trader has
either more or less stock at the cost of preempted or induced traders.
The stock market insider trader knowingly profits by “taking
advantage” of others before imminent public dissemination of material
information. On the other hand, without knowledge of material nonpub-
lic information, mispricing-seekers attempt to “take advantage” of others
before the share price corrects. Thus, the question is whether a moral
distinction between the two exists.
Often, mispricing-seekers mistakenly purchase overpriced securi-
ties or sell underpriced ones.53 Assume that, at some future date, the
mispricing disappears. At that time, under the Law of Conservation of
Securities, the mistaken trader has either more or less stock to the benefit
of preempted or induced traders. In contrast, insider traders rarely, if
ever, make errors about mispricing. Therefore, both market makers and
the public will react far more adversely to corporate insiders transacting
based on material nonpublic information than to traders engaged in the
difficult and possibly futile54 attempt to identify mispricing based on
widely available information.
In a somewhat similar context, Professor Anthony Kronman has
tried to distinguish between proper and improper “advantage-taking” for
the libertarian.55 One of his examples of impermissible “advantage-tak-
ing” is a contract executed because of a threat of violence.56 Other
examples of permissible or impermissible “advantage-taking” are the
use of deceit, wealth, talent, knowledge of certain facts, and monopoly
of a scarce resource.57 Professor Kronman mentions three possible prin-
ciples to determine which forms of “advantage-taking” do not invade the
rights of the “victim” and thus are permissible: natural superiority, utili-
53. Under the semi-strong version of the efficient capital market hypothesis, it is futile to
attempt to find mispriced stock based on public, as opposed to nonpublic, information. See
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 441–42 (11th ed. 2010). For numerous citations to
commentary both endorsing and rejecting this hypothesis, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, R
§§ 2.2.2, at 16 nn.33–35, 2.3.1, at 26 n.66. For arguments against the hypothesis, see Wang, Stock
Market, supra note 28; William K.S. Wang, Index-Fund Outperformance Not Logical in Rational R
World, PENSIONS & INV., Aug. 5, 2013, at 23, available at http://www.pionline.com/article/
20130805/PRINT/308059994/index-fund-outperformance-not-logical-in-rational-world. Even if
not completely futile, identifying mispricing may be extremely difficult. See id.
54. See supra note 53. R
55. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
472–97 (1980). Professor Kronman uses the phrase “advantage-taking” in a non-pejorative
fashion. See id. at 480. To emphasize the neutral nature of the term, this article will always place
quotation marks around the word “advantage-taking.”
56. See id. at 477–78.
57. See id. at 478–83.
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tarianism, and “paretianism.”58 The latter is a form of distributive jus-
tice: A particular form of “advantage-taking” should be allowed only if
it works to the long-run benefit of most people “taken advantage” of in
that particular way.59
To determine whether stock market insider trading is immoral,
applying a principle such as utilitarianism or “paretianism” requires
weighing the harm caused by the conduct. The Law of Conservation of
Securities ascertains the victims of each insider trade and enables analy-
sis of the indirect results of that injury. These results include wider bid-
ask spreads, decreased investor confidence, and higher equity cost of
capital.
With insider trading, “paretianism” would first use the Law of Con-
servation of Securities to identify the direct and indirect victims. Then,
“paretianism” would ascertain the general benefits of stock market
insider trading and somehow determine whether most victims are better
off in the long run.
A utilitarian would weigh any benefits of insider trading against the
detriments,60 including the direct and indirect injury resulting from the
Law of Conservation of Securities. In an earlier rule-utilitarian analysis
of the morality of insider trading,61 Professor Anderson considered the
58. See id. at 483–97. Kronman argues that only “paretianism” “is consistent with the basic
ethical commitments of libertarianism.” Id. at 485. Presumably, non-libertarians might endorse
one or more of these three principles: natural superiority, utilitarianism, and “paretianism.” A
separate part of Kronman’s article contends that liberals should not have a blanket preference for
tax over contract rules as a method for redistributing wealth. See id. at 474–75, 498–511.
Kronman’s article discusses face-to-face contracts rather than stock market transactions. The
line between face-to-face stock trades and stock market transactions is blurry. Especially with
large blocks, such trading sometimes involves conversations between buyer and seller. See Dan
Strumpf, Markets Keeping Faith in Humanity, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2014, at C1 (“Last year,
about 55% of stock trading by dollar volume took place in a ‘high-touch’ fashion, among human
beings communicating one on one and agreeing on the price. . . .”). For a discussion of the blurred
distinction between block trades and face-to-face trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, R
§§ 3.3.1, 8.2.2, 15.2.1; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, supra note 5, at 30–31. R
For additional discussion of a principled distinction between permissible and impermissible
“advantage-taking,” see Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 9, at 27–53. R
59. See Kronman, supra note 55, at 487 (“[O]ne reasonable approach is to interpret R
paretianism as requiring only that the welfare of most people who are taken advantage of in a
particular way be increased by the kind of advantage-taking in question. . . . [I]t is only necessary
to decide whether most victims of fraud will be better off in the longrun . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
For discussion and disagreement with aspects of Kronman’s analysis, see Larry Alexander &
William Wang, Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice, 3 L. & PHIL. 281 (1984), reprinted
in 2 CONTRACT LAW 453 (Larry Alexander ed., 1991); William K.S. Wang, Reflections on
Contract Law and Distributive Justice: A Reply to Kronman, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 513 (1982).
60. For a discussion of the alleged general benefits and detriments of stock market insider
trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, §§ 2.2–2.3. R
61. See Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 9, at 29–33. At one point, Anderson includes a R
utilitarian analysis of whether society is justified in criminally punishing insider trading. See id. at
31–33. For discussion of the practical difficulty of a utilitarian analysis of punishment, see
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possible widening of bid-ask spreads and increases in the equity cost of
capital62—both indirect consequences of the Law of Conservation of
Securities as applied to insider trading.
VIII. SOME MINOR QUIBBLES
Professor Anderson faults the Law of Conservation of Securities
for finding harm in every omission to disclose by someone making a
profitable trade.63 As noted at the beginning of this article, the Law of
Conservation of Securities identifies the victims of the stock market
insider trade itself and does not address the injury from the accompany-
ing non-disclosure.64 (In fact, the material non-disclosure accompanying
an insider trade injures those opposite-type traders to whom the insider
trader had a duty to disclose, possibly the party on the other side of the
trade, contemporaneous opposite-type traders, or all opposite-type trad-
ers from the time of the insider trade to public dissemination of the
information.65)
In addition, Professor Anderson argues that an insider trade has no
innocent victim when the transaction preempts another insider trade.66
Such preemption is highly unlikely, however. A preempted buyer must
be quite interested in transacting in the company stock but dissuaded by
the price change resulting from the insider trade.67 Assuming someone is
willing to trade on material nonpublic information, as long as she knows
that the price remains inaccurate, a price change is unlikely to dissuade
her from acting.
William K.S. Wang, The Metaphysics of Punishment—An Exercise in Futility, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 306, 318–28 (1976).
62. See Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 9, at 30. To determine the morality of insider R
trading, Professor Anderson also applies principles other than utilitarianism. See id. at 27–29,
33–53 (applying, inter alia, principles of deontology).
63. See Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra note 1, at 804 (“Moreover, it is not just that the R
Law of Conservation of Securities finds some harm in every profitable trade prior to an
unanticipated material disclosure; it identifies the same harm in every profitable trade omission.”).
64. See supra Part II.
65. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. R
With SEC Rule 10b-5 private class actions by either purchasers or sellers, under certain
circumstances the U.S. Supreme Court creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance when the
issuer makes a materially misleading statement. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014) (“[I]f the plaintiff also shows that he purchased stock at the market
price during the relevant period, he is entitled to a further presumption that he purchased the stock
in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation.”); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240–50
(1988). For a discussion of this rebuttable presumption, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, R
§ 4.7.3.
66. See Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra note 1, at 805 & n.63. R
67. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, § 3.3.6; Wang, Victims, Violators and Remedies, R
supra note 5, at 31–35. R
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A stock market insider trade has two different classes of victims:
those harmed by the accompanying non-disclosure and those harmed by
the transaction itself. The Law of Conservation of Securities identifies
the individual(s) injured by the insider trade itself, which does not neces-
sarily include the party on the other side.
Were stock market insider trading victimless, society would be less
likely to regulate the conduct strictly. The Law of Conservation of
Securities demonstrates that victims do exist.
As Professor Anderson acknowledges,68 stock market insider trad-
ing may have negative consequences. These include wider bid-ask
spreads by market makers and lower investor confidence. Both of these
effects increase the cost of equity capital of public companies. The Law
of Conservation of Securities explains why the decrease in investor con-
fidence is rational, especially because risk-averse individuals do not
know whether they will be victims. The Law of Conservation of Securi-
ties also explains why market maker bid-ask spreads will increase:
because market makers transact so frequently, they are especially likely
to be induced or preempted traders.
With a utilitarian approach, Professor Anderson suggests that com-
panies should weigh the negative results against the positive effects
when deciding whether to allow employee insider trading.69 The Law of
Conservation of Securities underlies the costs that Professor Anderson
wants issuers to consider.
Even if the firm fully discloses its policy of allowing insider trad-
ing, and even if the stock’s market price somehow accurately adjusts
(despite a general lack of knowledge of the size of the bid-ask spread
increase and possibly the extent of insider trading), the price change will
not fully compensate those who trade especially frequently.
Professor Anderson’s willingness to allow issuer-approved insider
trading also raises corporate governance questions. Employee insider
trading (or tipping) is a form of inefficient, possibly huge, and perhaps
secret, compensation. Were a corporate board of directors to grant such
compensation, one might question whether the board really has the inter-
ests of the company and the shareholders at heart. Were the fully inde-
pendent directors and shareholders to approve such compensation, one
might question whether they understand the consequences.
A victim of insider trading may be either an induced purchaser or a
preempted buyer, neither of whom has previously held shares in the
68. See Anderson, What’s the Harm?, supra note 1, at 799. R
69. See id.
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company. Even if the company decisionmakers are both extremely inde-
pendent and sophisticated in deciding to permit insider trading, they may
not adequately consider the interests of these individuals who do not
presently hold shares. While insider trading may raise the firm’s cost of
equity capital,70 the company may be relying on other sources of
financing.
The Law of Conservation of Securities demonstrates that stock
market insider trading is “advantage-taking.” Some “advantage-taking”
stock transactions are moral; others are not. To determine whether stock
market insider trading is immoral, applying a principle such as utilitari-
anism or Professor Anthony Kronman’s “paretianism” requires consid-
eration of the harm stemming from the conduct. The Law of
Conservation of Securities identifies the victims of each insider trade
and enables analysis of the indirect consequences of that injury.
70. See supra note 15. R
